Remembering Andre Gunder Frank While Thinking About The Future

2009年7月15日星期三

Another World is Possible：論21世紀左翼運動的新戰略（華勒斯坦）

Another World is Possible

論21世紀左翼運動的新戰略

作者／伊曼紐爾．華勒斯坦原著 兩岸犇報編譯組摘譯

【編者按】美國《每月評論雜誌》2008年6月號刊登了著名學者伊曼紐爾•華勒斯坦(Immanuel Wallerstein)題為〈思考未來莫忘貢德•弗蘭克〉的文章，提到19世紀左翼運動的戰略，在1968年世界革命後就已經失效，新戰略要根據短程、中程、遠程不同目標採取不同的形式。華勒斯坦認為，當前資本主義世界體系正面臨著一種體制危機，在可見的25～50年內將由一個嶄新的體系所取代，只不過新的體系既可能更好也可能更壞，一切決定於左翼運動如何實現一個更民主和平等的中程戰略。「兩岸犇報編譯組」特別摘譯了該文給大家參考。我們省略了當中涉及世界社會論壇（WSC）的冗長討論，但不妨礙我們的理解，有興趣的朋友可以參照原文閱讀。

左翼運動議題的擬定其實是一件棘手的事，它涉及到三種長短不一的時間框架，我稱之為遠程、中程和短程戰略。彌漫在左翼內部的許多爭論往往因為混淆了這三個時間框架而無法聚焦。我將嘗試分別的討論這三個框架，其中最關鍵意義的就是中程階段，我認為有必要把它解釋清楚。

長程目標 另一個世界是可能的

在討論任何運動議題之前，我們首先必須考量它所置身的世界體系脈絡。近年來我一再指出，當代資本主義世界經濟正面臨一個體制危機。我所說的危機，既不是那種作為資本主義運作固有特徵的循環性經濟衰退或停滯，也不是有關新的世界霸權得以崛起的過程，它在一個歷史體系的生命歷程中，通常只會發生一次：當世界體系自我均衡的內在機制失靈從而陷入「混亂 」時，它就會「一分為二」（ bifurcates ）同時展開兩條路線的尖銳鬥爭，一直到新的秩序取而代之為止。這種鬥爭的結果在本質上是不可預測的，換句話說，最終走向哪一條道路的機會是各佔一半。如此一來，鬥爭所涉及的就不是現行體系的存廢，而是有關哪一個類型的世界體系將取而代之的問題。

我深信，我們正處於這種體制危機中，而且替代方案在未來的25年（或者說25～50年）間將會水落石出。屆時，我們會發現自己置身於另一個體系當中，與現行的體系相比，它可能更好也可能更糟。「遠程目標」就是這種歷史抉擇的結果，它曾經被勾畫成各式各樣烏托邦，但就個人而言，只能用一般性的術語來進行論述，我認為一個更好的世界體系應該是相對的民主與平等。我們大可盡情地描繪任何衷心渴望的烏托邦模型，但那都將無濟於事，我們所能做的是，朝著有利於我們的方向推進。

短程議題 兩害相權取其輕

「短程議題」較有意思。我們都生活在短程當中，每個人都關注著短程的事務。我們吃、穿、工作、睡覺、做愛和存活在短程中，對大多數人來說「短期」就是生活本身而非政治現象，他們當中有一部份人自認為對政治不感興趣，這或許是一種認識上的謬誤，因為實際上我們的社會生活多多少少受制於政治現實的變遷。我們無法迴避這些日常決定，不做決定本身就是一種決定，不管是否願意，政治舞臺無所不在、永無止息而且通常具有強制力。在我們當中有一些「激進份子」，但畢竟是少數，大多數人寧可選擇隨波逐流。但這只是一種表面現象，在某些狀況下原本消極的大眾也會憤怒和抓狂，表現的非常激進。雖然經驗表明，群眾暴動通常是不可預期的，也往往不是由職業活動家所推動，但是職業活動家卻倚靠這種暴動的可能。

儘管如此，作為激進份子，我們如果回想起前些年所做的任何決定，通常會因它的愚不可及而感到沮喪，其結果經常事與願違。這就給那些當初持不同意見的人有機可趁，到處扣帽子。於是，擁護「改良主義」或「國家主義」政策的人被說成是放棄武裝鬥爭的投降派：鼓吹「激進的」或「造反的」決議的人則被說成是「左傾幼稚病」。在這些機智的應答中，冷靜的分析退居幕後，我們很少做出徹底的檢討。所以，讓我提出兩個無疑將不受歡迎的論點：

第一、在短程戰略上，非但我們應該兩害相權取其輕，而且也毫無選擇。每個人都毫無例外地在避重就輕，只不過各自做了不同的選擇罷了。兩害相權取其輕總有一點以手掩鼻認同「現實」的味道，孰輕孰重並沒有公式可循，要視實際的狀況而定，它並不局限於在選舉，也適用於罷工、示威遊行和武裝鬥爭。

第二、如果拒絕選擇切合底層群眾所需要和期望的必要之惡，任何一項具有中程目標的左翼運動都不會得到大眾支持。人們首先生活在短程之中，而且絕大多數人對於當下的需要卻非常「現實」，如果人們的短程需求被忽視的話，對於大多數人來說再多的中程許諾也沒有用。

理智上的悲觀主意 意志上的樂觀主義

有關左翼運動的重大行動都發生在中程階段，但奇怪的是，它卻是最為人所忽視的領域。中程的行動當然比不上遠程目標的爭論那麼令人興奮，也不如短程行動看似積極。中期戰略是由持續性的準備工作(稱為政治教育)和對政權堅決的施壓(稱為建構運動)兩者所構成，並要以極大的耐心來等待成果。葛蘭西著名的口號「理智上悲觀主義、意志上樂觀主義」說得很對，樂觀主義鼓舞我們從事著悲觀主義視為是徒勞無功的任務(Sisyphean task ) 。如果說，我們在短程的決定中充滿著可恥的讓步，那麼，在中程議題上就應該拒絕任何令人不快的妥協。我們應該只從事於與體制改造有關的工作，即使沒有立即的回報。

我們嘗試藉由「革命」或者合法選舉來改造這個世界至少已經二百年了，就總體而言，說不上哪一個戰略曾經非常的成功。在今天，對這些本質上是19世紀的運動戰略還抱持著堅定信仰的人少之又少。在我看來，在認知上提出切合實際的戰略的轉捩點是1968年世界革命，他們並沒有拒絕長程的烏托邦，但更認真考慮中程階段的新戰略。1968年以來，產生過很多關於戰略問題的爭論，但都因為未能清楚地區分這三種不同的時間框架而徒勞無功。一種可適用於中程階段的替代性戰略，一直要到2001年創設「世界社會論壇(WSF)」的組織架構中，才有被發展出來的可能。

WSF是一種非常奇怪的組織（如果還稱的上是組織的話），宣稱它的基本原則是「開放空間」，是一種「橫向整合（水平的）」(horizontal)組織結構。他們強調，19世紀和20世紀主要國家和國際組織在結構上都是「縱向結合（垂直的）」 (vertical ）的等級制度，有科層結構和官僚，有官方的政治立場和組織成員。不同的組織有不同程度的內部紀律，也允許不同程度的內部爭論，但它們都是在政治領域致力於某種行動的政治性組織。

這些縱向結合組織的第二個特點是堅持政治上的忠誠度優先於一切，其它特定宗旨的組織(比如說，婦女團體、青年組織或和平運動)，只有作為一個從屬的和特殊化的團體納入一般性的垂直組織中才取得它的合法地位。與此相反的，作為一種水平結構的WSF將自身打造成一種即沒有官僚、沒有科層結構，也沒有公開的政治職位，有的只是開放和持續性論爭的公開論壇，任何人只要反對「新自由主義全球化和各式各樣的帝國主義」都能參加。這些特點構成了一種明確但非常鬆散的政治立場，由於其橫向整合的本質 ，WSF對於與會成員毫無控制力。

中程戰略 各種議題的在地連結

如果我們想要一個相對民主和相對平等的世界，那麼我們就必須打造它，或者通過推動更多的民主和平等來爭取實現它的可能性。今天的情況，我們都很難說政治的決策過程反映了每一個人的意願，或者是大多數人的意願，我們頂多是設立了代議制的議會體系，由他們做出自認為可行的決定。這些人最在意的是連任，要達到這個目的，沒有什麼比金錢還來得重要。

現在，要依靠什麼來推動轉向？很明顯地，組織那些歷史上沒有被同等對待的種族、宗教、婦女、青年和少數民族的底層群眾是必要因素。當然，過去的四十年來我們搞了很多這類的社會運動，但還遠遠不夠。要做到讓這些群體能夠大聲的控訴並使他們的聲音被聽到的程度，才能削弱我們所身處的不民主的政治結構。

危險是顯而易見的，第一個危險就是這些團體會誤以為他們的成就是提高特定群體的政治地位，而不是為全體人民發聲；第二個危險是存在著被壓迫者之間的相互競爭，每一個群體都在發出其小集團的聲音，而犧牲了其他底層群體的利益。只有通過這些不同群體緊密的在地連結，才能有效地清除統治集團對當前社會和政治權力的壟斷。

在過去的兩個世紀以來，平等主義最基本的要求包括：教育，醫療服務，終生的體面收入的保障、生態保育等等，每一個項目的社會支出都在日漸昇高。要在任何一種程度上達到這些要求，不能僅靠重分配的現有財富，而且要改變社會支出的優先次序。就此而言，有必要提高有關地緣政治、和平運動和生態保育的要求，但是如果這些運動不能將它自身的利益與立基於大眾運動的平等主義宗旨，甚至是社會潜意識融為一體的話，那麼這些運動也起不了什麼作用。

現在，我們面臨一個關鍵性的變項，增長的意識形態與合理分配的意識形態相互對抗。盲目的增長並非解決之道，還可能是造成困局的原因。對增長的意識形態的質疑是中程組織的核心要素，在階級鬥爭的現實中，中期階段是政治鬥爭的場域。階級不僅僅是有關職業、財富或勞動報酬方式而已，種族、性別和民族不但與階級有關，甚至是階級這一複雜的社會構造的組成部份。一旦，階級被重新界定，我們就真正地處於階級鬥爭當中。

新的世界 可能更好也可能更糟

總之，就長程戰略而言，我們沒有，也不能預先對我們想要建構的美好的新世界描繪出一個精確的藍圖；在短期戰略上，我們只有兩害相權取其輕才能防止事情變得更糟，至於孰輕孰重，則是由世界上被壓迫的人民來認定；最重要的是，我們必須記住，在下一個25年，也就是在中程階段，我們正身處於一個過渡時期，問題不在於我們是否想要維持資本主義制度，而是將由什麼來取而代之。我們必須毫不妥協地推動歷史向著一個更為民主更為平等的世界體系前進。在這個階段，我們並不能打造出這樣的一個體系，我們能做的是促使多元的政治活動成為可能。這些行動將會終結平衡點的傾斜，對抗那些更有錢、更有組織而且更不道德的集團——他們希望保持或甚至強化迄今為止我們所經歷的等級制度和兩極化體系的另一個變體。他們追求並不是資本主義；但可能更糟。

最後，我們必須謹記，在當前混亂失序的過渡期中，鬥爭的結果不會是任何必然的命運，它將由來自四面八方的每一個人作為一個整體的行動所打造出來，我們佔優勢的機會只有50％。有人可能會悲觀的認為五五波是太低了，但我認為是一個巨大的機會，我們應該牢牢地抓住。

Remembering Andre Gunder Frank While Thinking About The Future Immanuel Wallerstein

Home Subscribe Notes From the Editors Immanuel Wallerstein is senior research scholar at Yale University. He is the author, most recently, of European Universalism: The Rhetoric of Power (The New Press, 2006). This is from an address to the conference, “Andre Gunder Frank’s Legacy of Critical Science,” University of Pittsburgh, April 11–13, 2008. ESSAYS ON: » Africa » Europe » Feminism/Women and Politics » Globalization » Labor and Working-Class Issues » Latin America » Media/ Communications » 9/11–War on Terrorism » Social/Political Theory » U.S. Politics/ Economics

Andre Gunder Frank’s very long itinerary as a critical social scientist was marked by one unbudgeable constant. He was always committed to a left political agenda, and he was always analyzing the evolving current world situation as a left scholar-activist. I believe that the best tribute I can offer him is to do the same. Gunder’s father, Leonhard Frank, a distinguished novelist and man of letters, wrote toward the end of his life a novel based on his own life. Its title was Links, wo das Herz ist (“My Heart Is on the Left”). This would have been the most appropriate title for Gunder’s own never-written autobiography.1 Left agendas are actually complicated things to construct. For one thing, they are really constructed in three different time frames, which I shall call long term, medium term, and short term. Many of the arguments that pervade left discussions about left strategies confuse the three time frames, and therefore debate at cross purposes. I shall try to talk about all three time frames but keep them separate. When I speak however about the next twenty-five years, I am speaking about the middle term, which I think is the crucial period to clarify. To make any sense of this discussion, we have to think first about the world-systemic context within which an agenda of any kind can be constructed. I have been arguing in many recent articles and books that the capitalist world-economy, our modern world-system, is in a systemic crisis, by which I mean something that is quite different from one of its repeated economic downturns or stagnations that are a built-in feature of the way it functions, or the kinds of processes that allow for the emergence of new hegemonic powers.2 What I am calling a systemic crisis occurs only once in the life of a historical system. It occurs when the mechanisms that exist to bring the system back to some kind of equilibrium no longer function adequately, and the system can be seen to be moving far from equilibrium, thereby becoming “chaotic.” Chaos is here a technical term that describes a situation in which a system fluctuates wildly, erratically, and severely. At that point, the system “bifurcates” and there ensues an acute struggle over which of two alternative paths to new systemic order it might take.3 The outcome of such a struggle is intrinsically unpredictable. Or to put it another way, it is equally possible that, in the end, the bifurcating system will take one path or the other. The struggle is thus not about whether or not to retain the current capitalist system, since it cannot survive, but about what kind of world-system (or world-systems) will replace it. I call this struggle, for reasons I shall elaborate, the struggle between the spirit of Davos and the spirit of Porto Alegre. I believe that we are already in this systemic crisis and that within twenty-five (or twenty-five to fifty) years, the issue of the choice of a replacement will be resolved. We shall find ourselves in some other kind of system, one that might be better but also one that might be worse than the present system. The long term is what will come out of that historic choice. It is therefore about that other world that is possible, to use the slogan of the World Social Forum (WSF). The long term is what has been delineated in multiple designs of utopias. Personally, I think it is possible to discuss the long term only in very general terms. I define a better world-system as one that is relatively democratic and relatively egalitarian. Historically, no world-system has been either democratic or egalitarian in any meaningful sense. One that would have these characteristics would be distinctively different from all previous historical world-systems. I don’t think we can say much more than that. Specifically, I do not think that we can define in advance the institutional structures that would result in a more democratic, more egalitarian world. We can draft whatever utopian models we wish. I don’t think it matters, because I don’t think that drafting such models will have too much impact on what actually emerges. The most we can probably do is to push in certain directions that we think might be helpful. The short term is more interesting. We all live in the short term. Everyone is concerned, indeed very concerned, about the short term. We eat, dress, work, sleep, make love, and survive in the short term. We also are happy or sad, give offense or are hurt, entertain or are entertained in the short term. The short run is what most people think of as life. And for a large number of people, perhaps even for most people, the short term is not a political phenomenon. This is probably an error in perception on the part of those who think of themselves as apolitical since in fact the pluses and minuses of our lives are very much and continuously determined by changing political realities. Among those who debate political agendas, there exists a long list of decisions to be made about the short term, that is, this year and the next at most. Shall we vote or not, and if so for whom or for what party? Shall we sign a petition, or write a letter, or participate in a demonstration? Shall we strike, or support a strike? Shall we speak out to our neighbors or to other persons about our political views, or not? Shall we organize about this or that? And if we do organize, shall we do it locally or in a wider arena? Shall we acquire arms? The list goes on and on. It is a long list. Plus, the debates about what we should or should not do in our everyday lives are quite passionate. We tend not only to pursue our own views about appropriate decisions, but quite often we denounce those with whom we do not agree, especially if they too claim to be “on the left.” Yet, we cannot avoid these daily decisions. Abstaining from any of these decisions is itself a decision. Willy-nilly, the political arena is pervasive, continuous, and quite often overbearing. Some of us are “activists” — the very word is instructive, active as opposed to what? I suppose as opposed to “passive.” But activists are normally only a minority of the world’s populations. The larger majority seem to allow themselves to be carried along by the tide. This may be deceptive. The persons in the passive majority are often angry and sullen, and under certain circumstances, may erupt and become very active indeed. In fact, full-time activists count on this possibility of popular eruption, even if our experience has shown that such popular eruptions tend to occur unexpectedly and not usually as a result of activist prodding. Still, if at any point we who are activists reflect on the decisions we made a few years back, we are often dismayed at how foolish they were.The consequences are often quite at variance with what we expected. This adds grist to the mill of those who recommended other decisions at the time. Denunciations abound. Those who advocated what are called “reformist” or “statist” decisions are said to have sold out to establishment forces. And those who advocated what are called “radical” or “insurrectionary” decisions are said to be “infantile leftists.” In this repartee, sober analysis tends to recede into the background. We seldom do in-depth analysis of why particular short-term options did not pan out the way we had hoped. So, let me put forward two arguments that will no doubt be unpopular. The first is this. In the short run, not only should we support the lesser evil, but there is no other choice available, ever. Everyone, without exception, chooses the lesser evil. We just disagree about which choice is that of the lesser evil. We surely don’t want to choose the greater evil. Of course, what the lesser evil is in any particular situation depends on the situation. There is no formulaic answer. Often, it is to vote for a left-of-center party against a right-of-center party. Sometimes it is to support a “left of the left” party whose strong showing in an election might have an immediate impact. And sometimes it might be that abstention from voting is the least evil. Choosing the lesser evil always has the flavor of holding one’s nose, and being “realistic.” This choice of the lesser evil in the short run is not only about voting; it applies as well to strikes, demonstrations, and armed struggle. So, if someone denounces you for choosing the lesser evil, know that this person too is choosing a lesser evil, just making a different choice from yours. The second argument is this. No movement with a middle-run left agenda will have any chance of obtaining the popular support it needs if its advocates refuse to choose the lesser evil that meets the needs and expectations of the larger populace. People live in the short run, first of all. And most people are quite “realistic” about what they need here and now. No amount of promises about the middle run will wash with most people if their needs in the short run are ignored. Furthermore, we all have to be honest about the fact that we are choosing what we consider to be the lesser evil. We have in effect to say two things. It is the lesser evil for this or that reason. And choosing it, while necessary in the short run, will have no measurable effect on the middle run. We do not dance in the streets because our lesser evil choice prevails. We heave a sigh of relief, but that’s all. It is the middle run where the significant action concerning a left agenda is located. And strangely enough, it seems to me that the middle run is the arena that has been historically the most neglected in the discussions concerning left agendas. Action in the middle run is less exhilarating than debating the long run, and less seemingly active than action in the short run. The middle run involves a combination of continuous preparatory work (what is called political education) and constant pressures on the powerful (what is called the construction of movements) with a deep patience about seeing the fruition of all this work. Gramsci’s famous slogan, “pessimism of the intellect, optimism of the will” is exactly right. For the optimism pushes us to engage in what the pessimism tells us often seems to be and sometimes really is a Sisyphean task. As Eqbal Ahmad has commented: “Pessimism of the intellect is a call to genuine realism in comprehending reality, and optimism is a call to commitment to the common good.”4 The rules about the middle run are precisely the opposite of the rules about the short run. If in the short run, we are all into the business of compromises (many of them unsavory), in the middle run, we should make no unsavory compromises. We should push only for that which matters in terms of transforming the system, even if the rewards are not immediate. It is only by being truly militant that we can have any effect at all. Militancy requires realism too, but realism of a quite different kind than the choice of the short-run lesser evil. Realism in comprehending reality includes both reading history (in particular, past efforts at transforming the world) and reading the impact of past history on the social psychology of both popular forces in general and activist cadres. We have lived through at least two hundred years of attempts to transform the world — either via what are called “revolutions” or via attempts to use the ballot box to vote oneself into power in the states and thereby legislate transformation. One cannot say that overall either of these strategies has been very successful. There have been (quasi-)insurrectionary revolutions, some by movements calling themselves communist, some by so-called national liberation movements. And there have been countless political victories by non-insurrectionary social-democratic movements. It is difficult to consider that either kind of attempt has succeeded in transforming the world. This is not to say that they haven’t accomplished some positive things. They have quite often been in the short run the lesser evil. But we no longer dance in the streets, retrospectively, because of either kind of victories. Or at least, most of us do not. And today, in the twenty-first century, the number of persons who put their faith in these essentially nineteenth-century strategies is rather small. The turning point in my view in perceptions of workable strategies was the world revolution of 1968. It seems to me that the revolutionaries—whether in the pan-European world, in the erstwhile socialist bloc, or in the South — were all expressing their deep skepticism about the success of these strategies and about their viability for future success. They were not rejecting the utopias of the long run. They were rather calling for a new look at strategies for the middle run. In the years since 1968, there has been much debate about such strategies. This debate has suffered from the failure to distinguish explicitly between the three time frames I have suggested as essential for clear thinking. It is only with the creation of the WSF in 2001 that there has come into existence a structure within which an alternative strategy for the middle run may possibly be developed. The WSF is a very strange kind of organization, if it can be called an organization at all. It claims to be a “horizontal” structure. It says that its basic principle is that it is an “open space.” The term “horizontal” is used in opposition to the term “vertical.” The argument is that the major national and international organizations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were all “vertical” in that they were hierarchical structures, with bureaucracies and officers, with official statements of political position, and with members. The various organizations might have differed in the degree of discipline that prevailed within them and in the degree of internal collective debate they permitted, but they all were political organizations dedicated to some kind of action in the political arena. These vertical organizations had a second feature. They insisted on a loyalty that took precedence over any other loyalty, and laid claim to primacy in the political arena. If there were other organizations with specific agendas (say, women’s or youth organizations, or peace movements), these organizations were considered legitimate by the general vertical organization only if they placed themselves within its fold as a subordinate and specialized group. The primacy of such general vertical organizations implied that their relations with any other organization in the same geographical arena, but not in their fold, could at most be one of temporary tactical alliance. As opposed to this mode of organization, the WSF as a horizontal structure is constructed as an open forum. That is, it is a structure without officers, without (or with only a skeleton) bureaucracy, with no public proclamation of political positions, and with open and constant debate. As a result, it claims to be inclusive of everyone. Well, not quite everyone. The WSF defined itself as a meeting ground of all those who rejected “neoliberal globalization and imperialism in all its forms.” It also excluded, at least in theory, political parties and armed movements. These specifications constituted to be sure a political position, but it was a very loose one, and by virtue of its horizontal nature the WSF has very little control over who actually attends its meetings. What was the point of such a curious animal? The argument went as follows. The WSF was permitting all organizations that wanted basic change in the world-system to assemble together, to exchange views with each other, to learn from each other, and perhaps above all to learn to tolerate each other. The organizations might be international, continental, regional, national, or local. The discussions would take place within a multitude of large and small sessions which, by the third WSF meeting, were all organized from the base up. That is, any organization, alone or in conjunction with others, could organize a session on any theme it thought important, choose the speakers or panelists, and invite all and sundry to attend. What has been the outcome of this kind of structure? The first outcome has been its replication at other levels. There now have been convened countless continental, regional, national, and local social forums, as well as so-called thematic forums. These other forums have all been self-organized and have not needed the permission of the worldwide WSF to do what they wished to do. It was assumed that they would all be horizontal open spaces. And most, if not all, have replicated the organizational model. The second outcome has been the geographical widening of participation in the worldwide WSF itself, as well as an increase in the numbers of persons who actually attend. The first WSF was largely Latin American and West European in composition, and some ten thousand persons came. Successive ones have come to involve participants from North America, South Asia, East Asia, and Africa, and the numbers have gone as high as two hundred thousand. There are still nonetheless geographic gaps — inadequate participation from East-Central Europe, Russia, and China. But the circle has been steadily widening. The third outcome has been a continual improvement in the way the worldwide WSF has been organized — the organization of panels from the base up (as I mentioned), the increased transparency of how the inevitable organizational decisions are being made, and the creation of explicit spaces for “networks” of organizations to meet and to organize joint activities. The WSF is a tumultuous arena—less because of political differences than because of arguments about strategy. There have been, from the beginning, those who chafed at the horizontality of the structure. At the least, some feel, it has been exaggeratedly horizontal. They have said that the WSF must do more than “talk” it must act. And for many persons, action means moving in the direction of verticality — explicit political stances and explicit organization of political actions. Those who have resisted this demand have said that inevitably this means that, like all the previous “internationals,” the WSF would then move toward exclusions, and would thus fall into the strategy that, in their view, has so manifestly failed historically. The debate has been continuous and strong, if not yet acrimonious. And there seems to be emerging a compromise solution — keeping the WSF itself an open forum, while permitting specific networks to function within it, networks that would in fact take positions and organize political activity. I am not sure what will be the outcome of this debate, and whether or not the WSF will continue to be the central locus of world left activity or become what one person has suggested has been merely a “moment” in the history of world left activity. I think that, rather than trying to predict or prescribe a future for the WSF, it would be more to the point to discuss what kinds of political activity would in fact be meaningful in the middle run. When I speak of the two opposing camps in the struggle to determine the outcome of the bifurcation as that of the spirit of Davos and that of the spirit of Porto Alegre, I mean something quite specific. Davos, or the World Economic Forum, has been meeting since 1971, which is just after the world revolution of 1968. It seeks to bring together the elite of the world-system — capitalists, political leaders, major media figures, politically-conscious celebrities, and establishment intellectuals. It too is an open forum of sorts and, especially recently, the debates within it have been at least as strong as those within the WSF. The spirit of Davos is to preserve a world that is hierarchical and inegalitarian. And to the degree that capitalism as a system can no longer guarantee those principles, the more sophisticated of its members are clearly ready to envisage alternative systems. Neither private enterprise nor economic growth constitutes the bottom line, only political, economic, and cultural guarantees for the upper strata of the world-system. The spirit of Porto Alegre is precisely the opposite. The spirit of Porto Alegre incarnates today what we can possibly mean by the world left. If we want a world that is relatively democratic and relatively egalitarian, then we must build it, or the likelihood of achieving it, by pushing for more democratization and more egalitarianism. Let’s look at each of these concepts. Democracy means in terms of its etymological origins “rule by the populace.” The populace is not a specific group within it; it is supposed to mean everyone. And whatever goes on today, it is hard to say that the political decisions that are made are made as a reflection of the will of everyone, or even of a majority of the people. We have representative parliamentary systems at best, in which the voters (who are usually defined in some way as less than the whole adult populace) choose, every x-number of years, a small group of people who make decisions as they think preferable, bearing in mind most often the likelihood that they can be re-elected — for which, as we know, they need among other things much money. Now what would push in another direction? It is quite obvious that organizing those that have been historically left out of the equation is an essential element of doing this. And of course, particularly in the last forty years or so, there has been a lot of this — organizing women, ethno-racial and religious understrata, sexual and age-based understrata, and indigenous peoples. But there has not been nearly enough of such building of social movements. To the extent that such groups speak loudly and make their voice felt, it weakens the existing undemocratic political structures within which we live. And this in turn strengthens the social psychological resolve of these groups. This is generally what is subsumed in the word empowerment. Now there is an obvious danger here. One is that these groups will count their achievements in terms of admission of their particular group to high political posts rather than in greater voice for the demos as a whole. And the second is that there will be a competition of the oppressed with each other, each demanding its partial voice at the expense of or prior to the achievement of partial voice by other understrata. It is only by solid alliances at the local level of these various groups that one can effectively wear away at existing monopolization of social and political power by dominant groups. The “majority” has to be expanded and become more inclusive across the board. Strangely enough, it is by defending the rights to socio-cultural autonomy (which may also be socio-political autonomy) of the various understrata that the majority can really be expanded. And this can only really be done to the degree that the members of any particular understratum question the often obscure and hidden decision making of their own leadership. Of course, none of this is easy and the shoals are many. That is why any kind of overall vertical structure is inherently self-defeating. What is needed is thousands of constant local actions by multiple different groups. It is in this way and this way only that undermining the pseudo-legitimation of the existing structure can be achieved. This has been the principal virtue up to now of the WSF. But of course the world of the WSF has been manifestly insufficient. What these groups are fighting for is a realistic definition of rights — all those rights enshrined in the multiple liberal constitutions that today almost every country has enacted, and which are constantly ignored, abraded, or violated outright — by the legislatures, executive powers, and the very judiciary that is supposed to defend and enforce them. What is called for is pressure, more pressure, uncompromising pressure for all those rights that theoretically have already been acquired. And then pressure, more pressure, uncompromising pressure for whatever rights are not yet enshrined in these documents. Of course, this involves loading and overloading the demands for distribution. This is where the egalitarian thrust comes in. The basic egalitarian demands over the past two centuries have been for (1) education, seen as the route to rewarding and rewarded work; (2) health services, seen as the prevention, care, and cure of biological malfunctioning; and (3) lifetime income guarantees, seen as the maintenance of a lifelong level of decent income, from infancy to very old age. What the left wants is more of each, and more of each now, at the social expense of other expenditures. To come anywhere even near this requires not merely redistribution of existing wealth but change in the perceived social priorities of expenditure. It is here that the demands must be raised concerning geopolitics, peace, ecology — all of which have movements that push these concerns. But if these movements do not integrate their demands with the basic underlying egalitarian thrusts that are located in the popular movements, and even more in the popular subconsciousness, then these movements are not helpful. And here we come to a crucial variable — the ideology of growth as opposed to the ideology of plausible and sufficient distribution. Unbridled growth is not a solution to our dilemmas but probably the primary cause of them. And questioning the ideology of growth is a central element in realistic middle-run organizing. Are there other things we can do? No doubt. In a previous discussion of a left political agenda, I suggested such tactics as making the liberal center fulfill its own theoretical premises, making anti-racism a defining feature of democracy, and moving to the degree that we can towards the decommodification of activities now commodified as well as preventing the commodification of things we have traditionally considered non-commodifiable (such as access to water, or human reproduction).6 What is important about each of these is the strong organized push in these directions. Even if this doesn’t accomplish immediately their realization, it affects the overall political ambiance and therefore the balance of power. It makes more possible tipping the bifurcation in the direction we want. Personally, I learn each day of other things that various groups are suggesting or trying out or getting ready to try out. The organizational imagination of the multiple understrata of the world-system is quite considerable, provided that we don’t act ourselves to suppress it. It is hard for activists to allow themselves to be advised by the demos whom they tend to consider to be too passivist and inadequately politically informed. But if we awaken the sleeping giant, it might turn out to be a very constructive sleeping giant. The middle run is an arena of political struggle, in reality of class struggle—provided we have a relevant understanding of who and what are the classes in struggle. Class is more than a matter of occupation or wealth or mode of remuneration for work. Race, gender, and ethnicity are not separate elements from class, nor are they substitute analytic entities. Race, gender, and ethnicity all constitute part of the complex social composition of the classes. But once class is thus redefined, we are indeed in a class struggle. And this is why it makes no political sense at all, for example, for a structure like the WSF to enter into discussions, debates, and social compromises with the components of the World Economic Forum at Davos. We are not searching for the lesser evil here. We are in a struggle over the transition to a different world-system. So let me try to resume my imagery of what it is we have to do to achieve a left political agenda. We have to define the long-time objectives in meaningful but still very general terms. We do not have, and cannot have, a precise idea of appropriate structures for the better world-system we want to construct. And we shouldn’t pretend that we have. That was one of the great historic virtues of Marx. He never claimed he could design what the “communist” world would actually look like in institutional terms. As for the short run, we have to keep in the forefront of our minds that there is never anything but the lesser evil. And we have to be ready to participate at all moments in pursuing the lesser evil, as it is defined by the oppressed populations of the world. If we do not, we shall have the greater evil, and there always is a greater evil. Work in the short run is primarily defensive. It is to keep things from getting worse. It is to preserve gains already achieved. But, most important of all, we must remember that in the middle run, the next twenty-five years, we are living in a time of transition. In this transition, the issue is no longer whether or not we want to sustain a capitalist system, but what will replace it. And we have to work very hard, and very uncompromisingly, to push in the direction of a more democratic and more egalitarian world-system. We cannot construct such a system in this middle run. What we can do is to make possible the multiple political activities that will end up tilting the balance against a richer, better organized, and far less virtuous group—those who wish to maintain or even reinforce another variant of the hierarchical, polarizing systems we have had heretofore. Their system will not be capitalism; it would probably be worse. We have to remember finally that the outcome of the struggle during the present chaotic transition is not in any fashion inevitable. It will be fashioned by the totality of the actions of everyone on all sides. We have only a fifty-fifty chance of prevailing. One can define fifty-fifty as unfortunately low. I define it as a great opportunity, which we should not fail to try to seize. Notes 1. I say “never written” although there exists on the Web a short item called “personal is political autobiography” and in his “online essays and other archives,” there is a section called “autobiographical essays” which contains ten items. But there is no full-fledged autobiography. 2. See “The Global Possibilities, 1990–2025,” in Terence K. Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein, coords., The Age of Transition: Trajectory of the World-System, 1945–2002 (London: Zed, 1997), 226–43; “The Modern World-System in Crisis: Bifurcation, Chaos, and Choices,” chapter 5 of Immanuel Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004), 76–90. 3. I use these terms in the sense that was given to them by Ilya Prigogine. See his The End of Certainty: Time, Chaos, and the New Laws of Nature (New York: Free Press, 1996). 4. Eqbal Ahmad, Confronting Empire: Interviews with David Barsamian (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 2002), 152. 5. I have argued this in detail in my Utopistics: Or, Historical Choices for the Twenty-First Century (New York: New Press, 1998), especially chapter 1. 6. Immanuel Wallerstein, “A Left Politics in a Time of Transition,” Monthly Review (January 2002): 17–23.